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Introduction
Economists have often envisaged an important role for the manufacturing sector in the structural transformation of an underdeveloped economy. While Lewis (1954) focused on the ability of manufacturing to absorb surplus labor from the traditional sector, Kaldor (1967) claimed that a fast growth rate of national income can only be achieved if a dynamic, fast-growing manufacturing sector leads the way. onwards (Srinivasan and Narayana 1977; Ahluwalia 1991) . 3 Although the performance of the manufacturing sector improved from the late 1970s and early 1980s onward, the recovery was less than spectacular and its contribution to real GDP increased only marginally. For example, the share of manufacturing value added in GDP during 1984 GDP during , 1994 GDP during and 2005 .06% and 17.08% respectively (Kotwal et al. 2011) . Thus, even the high rates of GDP growth that India achieved during the period 1985-2005 was not on account of a dynamic manufacturing sector. Rather, the most significant 2 Although Lewis (1954) speaks throughout of the 'modern' as opposed to the 'traditional' sector, manufacturing is certainly an important component of the modern sector. Moreover, the literature on 'patterns of development' has consistently emphasized that one of the observed empirical patterns is the increasing contribution of manufacturing to both GDP (in value added terms) as well as employment in the process of 'structural transformation' (Syrquin 1998) . 3 Throughout this paper, our focus will be on the 'organized' manufacturing sector. The increasing proliferation of 'unorganized' manufacturing in recent decades necessitates a separate analysis of its evolution and its links with the organized sector through processes of ancillarization and subcontracting.
contribution to overall growth was made by services: the value added share of services in GDP went up from 42.28% to 58.31% between 1984 42.28% to 58.31% between and 2005 42.28% to 58.31% between (Kotwal et al. 2011 ).
Nevertheless, the organized manufacturing sector in India today is quite significant in absolute terms. During 2012-13, the sector consisted of 222,120 factories employing 10 million workers. In the same year, the net value added by the sector amounted to 8602 billion Indian rupees -approximately 139 billion dollars -that accounted for about 10% of India's GDP (Basu and Das, 2015) . The launch of the "Make in India" campaign by Prime Minister Narendra Modi in 2014 indicates that the current administration is keen to emphasize the centrality of manufacturing to future economic development of the nation. Hence, it is important to have a clear understanding of the relative importance of different factors in the evolution of the organized manufacturing sector in India. Such an understanding can then inform policy decisions with regard to its future trajectory.
The literature on the evolution of Indian manufacturing industries is vast. In this paper, we focus on one particular aspect that has been discussed extensively in the more recent policy-oriented literature: the relationship between manufacturing performance and labor legislation (Fallon and Lucas 1993; Besley and Burgess 2004; Sanyal and Menon 2005; Aghion et al. 2006; Ahsan and Pagés 2009; Kotwal et al. 2011) . Within this literature, it is possible to identify at least two related but distinct strands that differ with respect to their primary object of investigation.
First, during the early 1990s, one strand of literature developed with the aim of explaining the causes and consequences of "jobless growth" in Indian manufacturing during the 1980s. 4 This literature emphasized the role of industrial relations within manufacturing units in determining output and employment. However, the climate of industrial relations was understood to be depending solely on labor legislationspecifically the amendments to the Industrial Disputes Act (IDA) of 1976 and 1982. The central amendment to Chapter V-b of the IDA requiring employers in manufacturing establishments with more than 300 workers to acquire government permission before "lay-offs" and "retrenchment" was passed in 1976. 5 In 1982, this amendment was extended to establishments with 100 workers. The literature that emerged in the 1990s
emphasized that these amendments made employers averse to hiring workers by making it difficult to fire them. The result was jobless growth (Fallon and Lucas 1993) .
The early literature, represented by Fallon and Lucas (1993) , used a "before-after" framework with regard to legislative changes in 1976 and 1982-84 to investigate the effect of industrial relations on manufacturing performance at the industry or all-India level. In the post-2000 period, an influential strand of literature has tried to use state-level variation in amendments to the IDA to explain the long-run variations in the performance of the manufacturing sector across states. The basic argument put forward by this literature is that states with a greater pro-worker tilt in labor legislation have fared worse in terms of manufacturing outcomes. In particular, it has been argued that pro-worker legislation increases the bargaining power of workers and thereby reduces the propensity 4 "Jobless growth" refers to the fact that while value added in Indian manufacturing grew at 6.3% during 1979-87, employment growth was negative and stood at -0.3% (Bhalotra 1998 , Table 1 ). 5 The IDA defines a layoff as "the failure, refusal or inability of an employer on account of shortage of coal, power, or raw materials or the accumulation of stocks or the breakdown of machinery or natural calamity or any other connected reason to give employment to a workman whose name is borne on the muster rolls of his establishment." Layoffs are limited to 45 days on half pay. On the other hand, retrenchment is defined as "the permanent termination of a worker's service, other than on account of punishment, retirement, ending of a contractual period, or continued ill-health" (Bhattacharjea 2009 ).
of employers to invest (Besley and Burgess 2004, pp. 102) . However, the empirical procedure adopted and evidence marshaled for making such a claim have been criticized extensively (Bhattacharjea 2006 (Bhattacharjea , 2009 Kotwal 2011) . In particular, Bhattacharjea (2006) has convincingly argued why the regulatory measure used by Besley and Burgess (2004) is flawed.
In this paper, we revisit the issue of explaining cross-state variations in manufacturing performance in terms of the industrial relations climate by focusing attention on two important issues. First, as our point of departure, we use the idea that intrinsic profitability of industries located in a particular state might be an alternative and independent determinant of cross-state variations in manufacturing performance. Second, we take Bhattacharjea's (2006 Bhattacharjea's ( , 2009 ) methodological critique of Besley and Burgess (2004) seriously, and so replace the regulatory measure that they construct with a more direct measure of the climate of industrial relations: total number of man-days lost to all industrial disputes (strikes and lock-outs).
What could justify using intrinsic profitability as a valid point of departure for our analysis? First, in the past, economists have emphasized the possibility that intrinsic profitability matters and that it might be an independent determinant of industrial performance. For example, in a paper focusing on the economic performance of the state of West Bengal, several prominent economists suggested that more than poor labor relations, the decline of the manufacturing sector in the state may have been caused by a decline in the "intrinsic profitability of industry in West Bengal" (Banerjee et al. 2002) .
Second, the profit share -a key component of the rate of profit -is a measure of distribution of income between employers and workers. Thus, a rising profit share in the organized manufacturing sector, as found by Basu and Das (2015) for the period 1982-83 to 2012-13, is difficult to reconcile with high or growing bargaining power of labor, irrespective of pro-labor legislation. Thus, pro-labor legislation, to the extent it exists, might not translate into actual changes in the bargaining power of labor. Hence, using the former might lead to a mis-specified empirical model.
Finally, while the climate of industrial relations might certainly have a bearing on manufacturing performance, it might also be correlated with intrinsic profitability (which is also a plausible, independent determinant of manufacturing performance). Thus, failure to control for profitability while investigating the effect of industrial relations climate on manufacturing performance will give rise to biased results owing to an omitted variable bias.
In Finally, our work can be linked to broader concerns regarding inequality in India, particularly in the neoliberal (post-1991) era. Using household level data on monthly consumption expenditure from the National Sample Survey (NSS), scholars have found that since 1991, inequality has increased between urban elites (such as enterprise owners, managers and professionals) and rural rentier classes (such as moneylenders and absentee landlords) on the one hand and urban workers, marginal farmers and landless agricultural workers on the other (Vakulabharanam 2010 ). More specifically, using the same NSS data, Basole and Basu (2015) have shown that in the post-1991 era, inequality within food and non-food group expenditures has declined, even as overall expenditure inequality has increased over time. They have argued that the rise in overall expenditure inequality is mainly driven by the share of non-food spending. This tends to be more unequal than food spending and has increased rapidly in the average household's consumption basket. Crucially, both Vakulabharanam (2010) and Basole and Basu (2015) have suggested that state provision of essential goods can mitigate inequality.
Specifically, as economic growth picks up, the state can step in and improve public provisioning of education, health care, transportation and housing, since these services loom large as non-food items in household consumption. To the extent that profitability is found to be an important driver of investment in organized manufacturing, it further implies a very important role for the state in this regard, since a rising profit share -one of the components of the rate of profit -reduces the capacity of workers to access such services if they are privately provided. By using the profit rate as our measure of profitability, we analyze whether the distribution of income within manufacturing enterprises has indeed affected outcomes such as investment, net value added and employment. Although we do not analyze such links in detail in this paper, they are certainly an important avenue of future investigation.
Our empirical analysis shows that profitability is a more important determinant of industrial performance than industrial disputes. Our preferred specification suggests that a 1 per cent increase in the rate of profit is associated with a 0.7, 0.6 and 0.6 per cent increases in net value added, investment/capital stock ratio, and the number of workers employed. On the other hand, we find that a 1 per cent increase in the man-days lost to all industrial disputes is associated with 0.1 per cent declines in net value added and employment but no significant change in the investment/capital stock ratio. To us, this suggests that profitability is a more important determinant of industrial performance, both because it has numerically stronger effects (than industrial disputes) and because its effect is observable across a wider array of measures of industrial performance (than for industrial disputes).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we undertake a critical review of the relevant literature. Our aim is twofold -to specify the limitations of existing work and to emphasize the manner in which we address it with our own empirical strategy. In section 3, we discuss details of our empirical strategy; in section 4, we discuss our data sources, provide details about the construction of variables and discuss the main results of our analysis. The last section concludes the paper with some thoughts about future research.
Literature Review
The role of labor legislation in determining manufacturing sector performance was first emphasized during the attempts in the 1990s to explain the "jobless growth" of the 1980s.
The pioneering study in this field was Fallon and Lucas (1993) , who adopted a "beforeand-after" approach to identify the effect of labor legislation on manufacturing sector performance. Bhattacharjea (2006) proposes a general empirical model that can capture the essential points of the analysis in Fallon and Lucas (1993):
where and indexes industry and year, denotes employment, is a labor demand variable (calculated through estimation of labor demand functions), and is a dummy variable that switches from zero to one in the year of legislative change. While 3 measures the degree of inertia in the employment adjustment process, 5 shows how the legal change affects the degree of inertia in (1). Using industry-level disaggregated data from the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) that covered all manufacturing establishments employing 50 or more workers for the period 1959-82, Fallon and Lucas (1993) found both 3 and 5 to be insignificant. However, 4 was found to be negative and significant, implying the legal changes did cause a significant reduction of 17.5% in employment. Hence, Fallon and Lucas (1993) identified job security legislation as the key factor causing the phenomenon of jobless growth. However, as argued by Nagaraj (1994) and Bhalotra (1998) , there are several problems in the Fallon and Lucas (1993) analysis.
First, Fallon and Lucas (1993, pp.263 ) summarize their estimates as revealing a negative coefficient in 25 out of 35 manufacturing industries using a mere 25 percent level of significance. They conclude that the average drop in labor demand was 17.5
percent, but this figure is based on averaging across insignificant coefficients, which is a questionable procedure. Second, if the job security regulation had been of great importance, we would expect to observe threshold effects at 100 workers during the 1980s. 7 Instead, employment growth was positive in factories with less than 1000 workers and negative only in larger ones (Nagaraj 1994) .
A slightly different but related view of jobless growth was the assertion put forward by the World Bank (1989, Chapter 4) that the decline in employment during the 1980s was due to the acceleration in wages, which in turn was due to union-push. In a passing reference to employment, Ahluwalia (1991) reinforced this view. Thus, the arguments made by Fallon and Lucas (1993) and the World Bank (1989) share an emphasis on labor's bargaining power. The assertion is that job security legislation provided greater bargaining power to workers that, in turn, led to a wage-push and subsequently to a fall in employment.
However, if job security made retrenchment harder and led to greater union power, it is hard to understand how employers could have fired workers in spite of that.
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Of course, this is not to deny that job security legislation affects employment decisions.
Rather, it is to contest the rather simplistic view that such legislation is aimed at, or will necessarily lead to, an improved bargaining power of workers. Moreover, using ASI data, both Nagaraj (1994) and Bhalotra (1998) have established empirically that despite the fall in the number of workers employed, actual man-days worked increased during the 1980s.
Nagaraj (1994) goes further and argues that if one looks at the growth rates of earnings
per man-day rather than total earnings per worker, one can even counter the central claim of excessive wage growth during the 1980s. This is because earnings per man-day increased at a much slower pace, and in certain industries, it grew at rates that were even lower than the per capita growth of GDP during the 1980s. Thus, the "accelerating wage" argument for jobless growth does not hold up to careful empirical scrutiny.
Following the important critiques of Nagaraj (1994) and Bhalotra (1998) , the attempt to understand the role of labor legislation in determining manufacturing outcomes took a slightly different turn. The intervention of Besley and Burgess (2004) has been influential in this regard. They exploited state-level variation in the direction of amendments made to the IDA during the period 1947-92 for their analysis. 9 First, they classified amendments as pro-worker, neutral or pro-employer, assigning scores of +1, 0
and -1 respectively to each state for the relevant year. Second, they cumulated these scores over time to obtain a "regulatory index" for each state in each year. Finally, they used this index, along with control variables, to explain (with a one-year lag) state-level output per capita and employment in the organized manufacturing sector using a panel data set for 1958-92. They found that regulation in a pro-worker direction adversely affected two crucial outcomes -output and employment -for registered manufacturing.
At the same time, pro-labor legislation promoted output in unregistered manufacturing.
This led them to conclude that the domain of regulation -organized manufacturing -was indeed severely affected by amendments that improved the relative bargaining power of labor. However, the Besley and Burgess (BB) approach can be criticized on three separate grounds -the theoretical argument regarding the link between labor legislation and manufacturing performance, the suitability of the regulatory index as a measure of the industrial relations climate, and the econometric method.
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First, the arguments in BB do not provide much in the way of explaining why prolabor legislation should lead to poor manufacturing performance. In a short section titled 9 Although the IDA was initially passed in 1947 as a Central Act, provincial governments had the authority to pass amendments as they deemed fit. This is what allows Besley and Burgess (2004) to analyze the relationship between state-level variations in labor legislation and manufacturing performance. 10 It should be mentioned here that a number of studies have used variants of the regulatory index proposed by BB for different purposes. For example, Sanyal and Menon (2005) have used it to analyze the location of private investment across states while Aghion et al. (2006) have analyzed the interaction between delicensing of industries and labor legislation. Ahsan and Pagés (2009) have updated the BB index by disaggregating amendments into various classes and recoding some amendments in accordance with the suggestions of Bhattacharjea (2006) . Since these studies follow the same general approach as BB and since our focus is on pointing out the limitations of that approach and suggesting an alternative econometric exercise, we do not discuss these studies in detail. Interested readers may refer to the comprehensive and insightful reviews of Shyam Sundar (2005) and Bhattacharjea (2006 Bhattacharjea ( , 2009 .
"Theoretical Considerations," they mention two effects that are relevant for their analysis -a relative price effect and an expropriation effect. The relative price effect implies that pro-labor legislation will "raise the (fixed or marginal) cost of employing laborers" (BB 2004: 101) . This will lead either to a rise in the capital-labor ratio or lower the firm's optimal output by increasing the marginal cost of production. The expropriation effect means that over time, if labor's bargaining power goes up, there will be lower returns on investment for employers as labor "expropriates" a larger portion of the rent or surplus.
Thus, the key issue emphasized by BB is the possible increase in the relative bargaining power of workers due to pro-worker legislation.
Theoretically, the assertion that a relative price effect will lead to a rise in the capital-labor ratio conveniently assumes that the cost of capital (real interest rate) is constant. Empirically, there is no evidence to show that the "fixed or marginal cost of employing laborers" has gone up in manufacturing industries over time. Using a subset of the total organized manufacturing sector with data running from 1969 to 1986, Sau (1989) found a non-declining trend of the profit rate in India. More recently, using aggregate data from the Annual Survey of Industries, Basu and Das (2015) have analyzed the trends in both the profit rate and its different components -the profit share, the capacity utilization ratio and the capacity-capital ratio -in India's organized manufacturing sector between 1982-83 and 2012-13. Over the whole period of analysis, they have found that the rate of profit grew at about 1 percent per annum, primarily driven by a rising share of profits. As mentioned earlier, the analyses of Nagaraj (1994) and Bhalotra (1998) also cast doubt on the wage-push explanation of jobless growth during 1980s. Thus, for the entire period of analysis in our paper, there seems to be little evidence of a relative price effect of a rise in labor's bargaining power.
Regarding the expropriation of surplus by labor, the assertion by BB assumes that capitalists and workers have identical fallback positions. However, the fallback position of workers is crucially determined by factors such as the current levels of unemployment, inflation and the availability of credit and by the simple fact that the workers in manufacturing industries often have factory-specific skills that are of little or no use outside it. Thus, as Bhattacharjea (2006: 20) suggests, it would have been more appropriate to consider the reverse possibility -of capitalists expropriating a greater surplus from workers. Indeed, the rising profit share found by Basu and Das (2015) demonstrates the realization of such a possibility. In our own econometric exercise, we incorporate the profit rate as an explanatory variable to analyze the effects of the distribution of surplus within manufacturing establishments on net value added, investment and employment.
Second, although the theoretical emphasis by BB is on bargaining power, it is doubtful whether their regulatory index is a good measure of the same. In an important footnote, Besley and Burgess (2004: 99) mention that their index is highly correlated to the actual number of man-days lost to industrial disputes (strikes and lockouts); and this result is robust to the inclusion of state-specific time-trends unlike their other results.
However, as Bhattacharjea (2006) While a rise in industrial disputes might be expected to have a negative impact on manufacturing performance due to disruption in production, it is equally plausible to allow for a reverse causal effect. When there is slowdown or stagnation, the size of the pie shrinks and the struggle over its division -between capitalists and workers -becomes more acute. In a similar manner, industrial performance might also have a causal effect on profitability. It is possible that robust and high growth might provide incentives for firms to upgrade their technology and thereby enhance profitability. We address the valid concern of endogeneity in two different ways. Finally, Bhattacharjea (2006 Bhattacharjea ( , 2009 
Empirical Strategy

Econometric Model
To test the relative importance of profitability and the climate of industrial relations in explaining the variation of manufacturing sector performance across Indian states, we use the following econometric model log = 1 log + 2 log + + + + × +
where and indexes states and years, is a measure of manufacturing sector performance, is a measure of intrinsic profitability, is a measure of the climate of industrial relations, is a vector of control variables, are state fixed effects, are year fixed effects, denote state-specific linear time trends, and refers to an unobserved stochastic error term.
For the analysis in this paper, we use three alternative measures of manufacturing sector performance as the dependent variable in (2): net value added, investment (normalized with the stock of fixed capital), and total workers employed. The key independent variables in (2) are profitability and the climate of industrial relations. We measure profitability by the rate of profit (flow of profit income divided by the replacement cost value of the stock of fixed capital), a standard measure used in the heterodox literature (see, for instance, Basu and Das, 2016) . Our measure of the climate of industrial relations is the man-days lost to industrial disputes per worker, where industrial disputes refer to lockouts and strikes. Our primary interest is in the parameters, 1 and 2 in (2), which measure the partial effect of profitability and industrial disputes, respectively, on manufacturing sector performance.
To control for the effects of variables that might be correlated with manufacturing performance and with profitability and/or the climate of industrial relations, we include several control variables. To control for the state-level variation in infrastructure that is relevant for manufacturing sector performance, we include the installed capacity for electricity generation. This is motivated by the fact that we study the organized manufacturing sector, which uses electrical power as the key power input for its This is motivated by the fact that the results in BB were completely washed out as soon as state-specific trends were included (Besley and Burgess, 2004 , column 4, Table IV ).
To make sure that our results are not confounded by the effect of any pre-existing state level trends, we report results that include state-specific linear trends in the model in (2).
Thus, identification of the effect of profitability and industrial disputes in (2), in such specifications, occurs with respect to deviation from any pre-existing state-specific trends.
Results
Data
The data set used for the analysis in this paper is an unbalanced panel on the organized manufacturing sector for sixteen major states of India over the period 1969-2005. We assemble this state-level panel data set from different sources, details of which are available in the Appendix. We use three outcome variables for capturing manufacturing sector performance in the econometric model in (2): net value added, fixed investment (as a proportion of the replacement cost stock of fixed capital), and total number of workers.
Data on these three variables come from the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) and Besley and Burgess (2017) , with the replacement cost capital stock series constructed using the methodology in Basu and Das (2016) .
The key independent variables in our model in (2) [ Table 1 about here] 
Main Results
The main results of our analysis are summarized in Table 2 through 4. Table 2 reports results of estimating the model in (2), where the dependent variable is the logarithm of net value added; in Table 3 and 4, we present results of estimating the same model, but with the log of investment (normalized by the stock of fixed capital) and the log of the number of workers, respectively, as dependent variables.
[ Table 2 about here]
Net Value Added as Measure of Industrial Performance: Basic Results
The first column of Table 2 presents estimates for a stripped down version of the model in (2) with log of net value added as the dependent variable. In this version, the only regressors are the measure of industrial climate (logarithm of man-days lost to all industrial disputes per worker) and profitability (logarithm of the rate of profit), apart from state and year fixed effects. The coefficient on profitability is positive and statistically significant at the 0.1 per cent level; the coefficient on industrial disputes is negative and significant at the 1 per cent level. In column 2, we add the full set of controls: log of per capita net state domestic product (in fixed prices), log of the adult literacy rate, log of the installed electricity generation capacity, log of the population, and an index for the ideological orientation of the state government. When we add these controls, the coefficient on profitability increases a little and remains strongly significant; similarly, the coefficient on industrial disputes remains negative (and larger in absolute value) and significant.
Column 3 includes the full set of controls, state and year fixed effects and statespecific time trends. The coefficient on profitability is 0.672 and is statistically significant at the 0.1 per cent level. This means that a 1 per cent increase in the rate of profit is associated with a 0.672 per cent increase in the net value added. The coefficient on industrial disputes is -0.115 and statistically significant at the 0.1 per cent level. Thus, a rise in man-days lost to industrial disputes by 1 per cent is associated with a 0.115 per cent decline in net value added. These results show that profitability is quantitatively more important in determining industrial performance -measured by net value addedthan industrial climate -measured by the man-days lost to industrial disputes per worker.
Net Value Added as Measure of Industrial Performance: Addressing Concerns of Endogeneity
While the basic result presented in the first three columns of Table 2 show that profitability is a more important determinant of industrial performance than industrial disputes, there can be valid concerns about endogeneity. It is plausible that industrial performance -net value added -has a reverse causal effect on both industrial disputes and profitability. Industrial growth, by increasing the size of the pie, can reduce the likelihood of industrial conflict between employers and workers. Moreover, industrial performance can boost profitability through both demand and supply channels, a larger market and technological upgradation, for instance. To address concerns of endogeneity giving us biased estimates, we estimate two other specifications and report their results in columns 4 through 7 in Table 2 .
In columns 4 and 5, we try to address the possible problem of reverse causality by including 1-lag and 1-lead of both industrial disputes and profitability in the basic model estimated in column 3:
While the lags are meant to capture possible delayed impacts of industrial disputes and profitability on industrial performance, the leads are meant to block the reverse causal channel that operated in a temporal sequence, i.e., industrial performance in the current period has an impact on industrial disputes and profitability in the next period. If industrial performance has a causal impact on industrial conflict (and profitability) in the temporal sequence sense, then that effect is likely to be picked up by the correlation between net value added in a period and industrial disputes (and profitability) in the next period. Since industrial disputes (and profitability) is likely to be persistent, this would make the error term correlated with industrial disputes (and profitability) and lead to an omitted variable bias. Including the lead of industrial disputes (and profitability) is meant to address this possibility. The basic result in column 3 remains valid in columns 4 and 5, but with a difference: the rate of profit has a positive and statistically significant impact on net value added, but the negative impact of industrial disputes is both numerically small and statistically weak.
While the results in columns 4 and 5 address concerns about endogeneity when they operate through temporal sequencing, the possibility of contemporaneous correlation between industrial performance and disputes (and profitability) remains a possible concern. To address this concern, we report results from estimating a dynamic panel data model in columns 6 and 7 of Table 2 of the following form:
In model (4), we include 1-lag of the dependent variable in the basic model in (2) and also include 1-lag each of industrial disputes and profitability. The lag of the dependent variable is crucial and is meant to address two issues: first, it will capture the possible inertia in industrial performance (as emphasized in Fallon and Lucas (1993) and Bhalotra (1998)), and second, it will address concerns of reverse causality because it will capture the correlation between net value added in a period and industrial disputes (and profitability) in the next period. On the other hand, the lags of industrial disputes and profitability are meant to allow for delayed effects of these factors on industrial performance. While the model in (4) is useful to address the reverse causal channel from net value added to industrial disputes and profitability in a flexible manner, it adds a complication: the state fixed effects will be correlated with the lagged dependent variable, giving rise to Nickel (1981) bias.
To address this problem, we estimate the model with system GMM -the Blundell-Bond estimator for dynamic panel data models (Blundell and Bond, 1998) . This method allows us to treat net value added (1-lag), industrial disputes and the rate of profit as endogenous, and uses two sets of internally generated instruments for GMM estimation: (1) first difference of net value added (1-lag), industrial disputes and the rate of profit as instruments in the levels equation; and (2) Table 2 is our preferred specification and shows that while a 1 per cent increase in the rate of profit is associated with a 0.655 per cent increase in net value added, a 1 per cent increase in man-days lost to industrial disputes reduces net value added by only 0.097 per cent.
Investment and Employment as Measures of Industrial Performance
In Tables 3 and 4 , we report results that are similar to those reported in Table 2 but with different measures of industrial performance: in Table 3 , we use log of the investmentcapital stock ratio, and in Table 4 , we use log of the number of workers as the dependent variable.
[ Table 3 about here]
The results in Table 3 are similar to those reported in Table 2 [ Table 4 about here]
In Table 4 , we report results with log of the number of workers as the dependent variable (the measure of industrial performance). We see that the effect of the rate of profit on employment (number of workers) is quantitatively similar in magnitude and statistically similar in levels of significance to those reported in Table 2 and 3. Similarly, the effect of industrial disputes on employment of workers is also similar to those reported in Table 2 . For our preferred specification in using a linear dynamic panel data model (with state-specific time trends) in column 7, we see that a 1 per cent increase in the rate of profit is associated with a 0.561 per cent increase in the number of workers, and the result is statistically significant at the 0.1 per cent level. On the other hand, the effect of industrial disputes is negative: a 1 per cent increase in industrial disputes (mandays lost to industrial disputes) is associated with a 0.092 per cent decrease in the number of workers, and this effect is statistically significant at the 1 per cent level.
Conclusion
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to take up the suggestion in Banerjee et al. (2002) seriously that what they call "intrinsic profitability" might be an independent and important factor to explain differential industrial performance across Indian states, in states. We find that profitability is a much more significant factor in explaining the variation of industrial performance -measured by net value added, investment/capital stock ratio, and total number of workers -across India's states than industrial disputes.
Our baseline specifications suggest that a 1 per cent increase in the rate of profit is associated with a 0.7 per cent increase in net value added, a 0.6 per cent increase in investment/capital stock, and a 0.6 per cent increase in the number of workers employed.
All the three effects are statistically significantly different from zero. On the other hand, we find that a 1 per cent increase in the man-days lost to all industrial disputes is associated with a decline in net value added of 0.1 per cent, an insignificant change in investment/capital stock, and a decline of employment of workers by 0.1 per cent. This suggests that profitability is a more important determinant of industrial performance than the climate of industrial relations -the effect of the latter on investment is insignificant and on output and employment is numerically much smaller than the corresponding effects of profitability.
We would like to end by pointing out a possible weakness of the empirical analysis in this paper, and an avenue of future research. We have attempted to address concerns about endogeneity with two strategies: a lead-lag specification and a dynamic panel method. While these methods seem reasonable, it would be useful to try out other approaches for dealing with the possible problems of reverse causality. We explored one alternative approach to this issue by using two instruments for industrial disputes:
unionization rate (log of the number of union members), and the inflation rate in the consumer price index for industrial workers (CPIIW). But these instruments turned out to be "weak" and so we did not report them in the paper -because weak instruments can increase the bias in the parameter estimates. Data on unionization is lacking for many state-years and when available it is not of good quality. Hence, other instruments need to be explored, something we have not been able to do in this paper. Answering this question will enable the undertaking of a more meaningful approach towards policy-making than a sole focus on labor legislation. Science (Besley and Burgess, 2017) .
Data on employment has also been taken from the ASI. We use the data on the total number of workers as our measure of employment. Again, for the period 1980-2008, we have obtained the numbers directly from ASI publications and for 1969-1979, we use the data from the EOPP website.
Finally, for our third dependent variable -investment -we use slightly different measures for two different periods. For 1980-2005, we measure investment as the ratio of net fixed capital formation (NFCF) and the stock of fixed capital (at the beginning of the period). The data on NFCF comes from the ASI, which also reports the stock of fixed capital on the basis of historical cost valuation. We use the following recursion to compute replacement cost capital stock: K(t + 1) = K(t) × [P(t)/P(t-1)]+ I(t), where K(t)
is the value of replacement cost capital stock at the beginning of period t, I(t) is the net fixed capital formation over period t, and P(t) is the value of the national wholesale price index for machines and machinery (WPIMM) in period t. In the initial period, t = 0, K (0) is the historical cost value of capital stock. This methodology has previously been used in Basu and Das (2016 We measure profitability using the rate of profit, which is computed as the ratio of profit income and the stock of fixed capital (measured in replacement cost) at the beginning of the year. We calculate profit income as the difference between Net Value Added and Wages of productive workers. Data for these variables come from the EOPP website and the ASI (1980 ASI ( -2005 .
For our control variables, the sources are as follows: data on total installed electricity generation capacity were taken from the 
